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“We Belt the World”: 
Dr. Leslie E. Keeley’s “Gold Cure” and the Medicalization of Addiction  
in 1890s London 
 
“We Belt the World”: A Keeley Company trademark from the 1890s. 
 
Dr. Leslie E. Keeley, proprietor of the “Gold Cure” for alcohol and drug habits, 
was the world’s best-known addiction cure doctor at the end of the nineteenth 
century.  Born in 1832, Keeley was an Illinois-licensed, American M.D. who received 
his degree from Chicago’s Rush medical college in 1864 and immediately served as 
an army surgeon in the US Civil War.  During the war he observed the drunkenness 
of the soldiers and decided that the drink habit was a curable disease.  After the war 
he took a position as surgeon for the Chicago and Alton Railroad, which brought him 
to the small village of Dwight, Illinois, 80 miles south of Chicago, where he rode a 
400-mile circuit on horseback and began to experiment with cures for habitual 
drunkenness.   
After a long series of unsuccessful attempts, he and a pharmacist partner 
John H. Oughton, believed that they had found a cure.  In 1879 they began to 
dispense it from their clinic in Dwight where they were joined by a third partner, 
Curtis J. Judd, who was Keeley’s brother-in-law and served as their business 
manager.  The three of them incorporated the Leslie E. Keeley Company in 1886.  
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The company identified gold chloride as the active agent of the cure, but because of 
its side effects, Keeley and Oughton suspended operations in 1885.  They re-
formulated the medication and in 1887 they re-launched the therapy as the ‘bi-
chloride of gold cure.’   
Word of the cure’s apparent success spread quickly.  Patients poured in and 
the facilities at Dwight were overwhelmed.  In order to cope with the numbers and 
also to reduce travel costs for patients, the Keeley Company began selling 
franchises in 1890, establishing the first branch clinic in Des Moines, Iowa.  The 
franchises stipulated that an investor held the clear and exclusive right to operate a 
Keeley Institute provided that they used Dwight-trained physicians to administer the 
cure.  The home company rarely charged royalties, but it insisted that the 
medications had to be bought from Dwight.  The franchise holder was responsible for 
running the operation and paying for the clinic’s expenses, including the salaries of 
the Dwight physicians.  What the clinic earned beyond these expenses was profit.  
On that basis, Keeley Institutes opened across the United States and Canada.  In 
1892 the Chicago Tribune and its powerful editor, Joseph Medill, backed the Keeley 
Company’s claim to have found a cure for the alcohol and drug habits, which 
boosted its popularity still further.  The Tribune continued to back Keeley throughout 
the 1890s and soon the Keeley Company “belted the world,” selling franchises and 
opening clinics from Dwight to London to Copenhagen, Sydney and Los Angeles.  
By June 1893, there were 118 Keeley institutes worldwide. 
Most importantly, tens of thousands of patients believed that the Gold Cure 
worked.  As many as 30,000 of them joined one of 370 US chapters of the “Keeley 
League” after completing the four-to-five-week residential cure.1 The League spread 
the word of successful cures via its Banner of Gold journal and its members wore 
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golden pins to signal their membership throughout the 1890s.  The Keeley message 
otherwise came through extravagant advertising pamphlets that wrongly identified 
Keeley as the first to declare that the alcohol and drug habits are a disease.2  The 
ads made abundant rhetorical use of gold as a medicine and they cast Keeley as the 
cure’s heroic discoverer and sole proprietor.3  Most dramatically, company 
advertising used effusive patient testimonials to back its assertion of a 95% cure 
rate.   
These claims, and the ads that carried them, were branded unethical by a 
sceptical, mainstream medical profession that was rapidly gaining power and would 
soon control American medical practice.  US physicians and their colleagues abroad, 
particularly in Great Britain and Australia, accused Keeley of quackery.  His 
advertising drew their ire, but they agreed that Keeley’s greatest transgression was 
keeping the formula for the Gold Cure medication a secret.  As I have argued 
elsewhere, Leslie E. Keeley was part of an earlier generation of physicians, many of 
whom viewed the new professionals with suspicion.  He argued that he had a right to 
earn a profit from his life’s work and claimed that the world was much improved by 
the existence of his cure and the expertise with which to apply it.  He felt that the 
compensation he received was a just reward and that secrecy was the only way to 
protect the cure’s integrity and to defend his intellectual property.4 
Nonetheless, continued controversy, particularly generated by the franchised 
clinics, which were effectively beyond the control of the home institute in Dwight, 
along with growing evidence of relapse, caused the company’s growth to slow by the 
mid-1890s.  Keeley died in 1900 and the international franchises began to close 
around the turn of the twentieth century.  The North American franchises had also 
struggled during the economic downturn of the mid-to-late 1890s.  The charismatic 
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doctor’s death only hastened the process of their closure in the early twentieth 
century, but the home clinic at Dwight continued to operate.  The company removed 
the “gold” from the therapy by 1925 and began calling it a treatment rather than a 
cure.  The Dwight clinic worked hard to align itself with medical and scientific 
orthodoxy, and also developed a close relationship with Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), 
which was founded in Ohio in 1935.  By 1945 the Dwight clinic held weekly AA 
meetings and in the 1950s and 60s it hosted a yearly “Summer Roundup” barbeque, 
which attracted thousands of AA members and Keeley graduates.  The Dwight 
facility continued to operate as a moderately expensive, up-scale research and 
rehabilitation centre until 1966, when it closed in the face of competition from state-
run facilities. 
Historians have long noted the Keeley phenomenon.  Early accounts were 
descriptive and empirical, but by the late 1970s historians began to explore the 
company’s broader cultural resonance.5  Cheryl Krasnick Warsh explained in 1988 
that a powerful sense of male camaraderie underlay the success of the Keeley 
Institute in New Brunswick, Canada.6  William L. White offered the most detailed 
description of the Keeley treatment in his 1998 book, suggesting that the Dwight 
Institute’s therapeutic success might have come from its creation of an atmosphere 
that was part science and part evangelical temperance rally.7  In 2005, Sarah W. 
Tracy argued that Keeley, despite his “professional quackery,” did at least as much 
as his mainstream rivals to popularise the idea of addiction as a “disease” in the 
United States.8  Even the London franchise, which is the subject of this article, has 
received historical attention.  In 1980, John K. Crellin took a biographical approach to 
the personal correspondence between Keeley and the London Institute’s director to 
examine some of the differences in British and American life and culture in the 
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1890s.9  Nonetheless, neither the Keeley story nor this body of fascinating historical 
research has had the attention it deserves beyond the specialized borders of alcohol 
and drug history. 
This article aims to bring that research to the attention of a broader audience, 
but also to build its significance through a close exploration of the debate that 
surrounded the London Keeley Institute in its first years.10  The London Institute 
opened in 1892 and was the most successful and longest lived of the international 
franchises.  It was profitable until 1922 and remained in operation until 1928, which 
places it among the longest lived of any of the Keeley franchises.  That outcome is 
surprising if we consider the British medical establishment’s furious opposition to the 
company’s opening.  By juxtaposing the British mainstream’s emphatically negative 
description of the Keeley cure with the equally committed language of Keeley’s 
supporters, this article argues that London’s mainstream professionals did not have 
the cultural authority to impose their assessment of the Keeley Institute over and 
against the popular language of “cure” that followed the Keeley phenomenon around 
the globe. 
While the story of the London Institute’s opening is an important episode in 
the history of addiction treatment, it also has significance for the history of medicine 
more broadly.  It adds to our understanding of “medicalization,” which sociologist 
Peter Conrad helpfully defines as “a process by which nonmedical problems become 
defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illness and disorders.”11  
As Conrad and others have shown, the changing conceptualization of habitual 
alcohol and drug use epitomised that process.12  A variety of people had participated 
in the medicalization of habit during the nineteenth century, from recovered users 
and moral reformers to scientifically trained physicians, but the debate accelerated 
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during the 1870s and was perhaps at its most contentious when Keeley’s London 
clinic opened in 1892.13  The two sides squared off, each brandishing a different 
therapeutic iteration of medical authority.  The Keeley side rallied behind an 
extravagant rhetoric of cure, while the mainstream grounded its authority in sober 
adherence to a strict code of professional ethics, but both sides agreed that habitual 
alcohol and drug use was a medical condition.   
The Keeley controversy reminds us that medicalization is not a tidy process. It 
forces us to consider a variety of ostensibly dissimilar attitudes that, despite 
appearances, still cohered beneath the broader conceptual umbrella of 
medicalization.  It also draws our attention to other contentious discourses that 
helped structure and give the debate meaning.  The struggle over the Keeley cure in 
London offers an example, not of science’s battle against superstition nor still less of 
correct vs. incorrect diagnoses, but rather, of the aggressive interplay between two 
therapeutic iterations of habitual drug and alcohol use as a medical problem, 
grounded in different rhetorical performances of medical authority.  Most importantly 
and perhaps most surprisingly, we will see that these two attempted medicalizations, 
despite their mutual hostility, needed and complemented one another.  
Medicalization did not lie in the victory of one side over the other.  It lay within the 
dynamic interplay of these mutually dependent discourses. 
 
The London Franchise and its Critics 
The process of acquiring a Keeley franchise usually began with the company 
granting exclusive rights to an agent for a defined period in which to put together the 
funds to purchase a franchise outright.  The agents who approached the company 
were often (but not always) local to the territory in question.  After securing the 
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company’s permission, the agent usually sought investors to join them in the 
enterprise.  Once the investors were in place, the company would complete the sale 
of the franchise, sometimes on interest-bearing instalments.  The London franchise 
offers a clear example of this system, but also of the challenges that confronted a 
nineteenth-century medical business that hoped to expand internationally. 
On 23 February 1892, the Keeley company granted Londoner J. J. Vickers a 6-
month option to complete a contract for the exclusive right to sell and administer the 
Keeley Gold Cure in Great Britain, with clinics in London and Liverpool.  To complete 
the contract, he needed to appear with 100,000 pounds, payable at Dwight, by 1 
August 1892.  This was a high-stakes game, which perhaps explains the enthusiasm 
with which Vickers played it.  Among his efforts to find British backers to buy the 
Keeley rights, he organised a public meeting for June 1892, to be held at London’s 
Westminster Hall, presided over by an assistant Bishop of London and endorsed by 
the country’s most eminent temperance organisation, the Church of England 
Temperance Society (CETS).  This, however, is where the trouble began. 
The meeting was billed as the introduction of the Keeley Gold cure to Britain.  
Keeley himself was to attend.  But Vickers’ widely distributed circulars and strenuous 
marketing efforts suggested that the event’s main purpose was to find backers for his 
plan to raise the 100,000 GBP required to purchase the franchise.  This financial 
interest drew unwelcome attention, particularly from Dr. Norman S. Kerr, founder and 
President of the Society for the Study of Inebriety (SSI) and Britain’s most influential 
medical expert on alcohol and drug habits.  Kerr was born in Glasgow in 1834 and 
received his medical degree from the University of Glasgow in 1861.  He was a total 
abstainer—a “teetotaller”—and a well-known temperance speaker throughout the 
country.  He was an enthusiastic member of the British Medical Association, where 
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he was the leading proponent of the idea that habitual alcohol and drug use—which 
he and his colleagues called “inebriety”—was a disease, not a moral failure.  He was 
thus among the early advocates of a “scientific,” medically based temperance 
movement rather than temperance as a moral crusade.14   
Kerr and his associates were very much a part of what historian Jim Baumohl 
identifies as a nineteenth-century movement to establish inebriate asylums based on 
the model of the insane asylum.15 The members of the SSI agreed that inebriety was 
a hereditary disorder that required institutional confinement and restraint, combined 
with strict medical supervision and treatment.  In 1884 the SSI resolved to agitate for 
the passage of inebriate legislation that included the power to sentence inebriates of 
any class to confined periods of cure in workhouses or homes.16  The Society’s 
activities were notably international, according to historian Virginia Berridge, who 
finds this particularly in the SSI’s connection to the older American Society for the 
Study and Cure of Inebriety.17  Probably via the advice of his close associate and 
friend, Dr. Thomas D. Crothers, the leading figure of the American society, Kerr had, 
by early 1892, developed an enormous dislike of Leslie E. Keeley.18  Kerr was very 
much a representative of Britain’s mainstream medical profession, and in a series of 
letters to the British Medical Journal (BMJ) and also the Lancet, he emphasised 
Keeley’s use of a secret cure as a breach of medical ethics that precluded any 
contemplation of the cure’s alleged results.   
Most pointedly, Kerr intervened in the planning of the upcoming Keeley 
meeting at Westminster Hall.  The story broke in the BMJ on 25 June 1892, 
explaining that Bishop Alfred Barry “had been captured as the chairman” of a 
meeting that was “most unwisely” announced “in order to set forth the so-called 
virtues of a notorious proprietary and secret cure for inebriety.”19  Thanks to Kerr’s 
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intervention, the journal was “glad to be able to state that at the last moment the 
authorities of that Society changed their mind as to giving their countenance to [the] 
meeting.”20  The BMJ was relieved “for the sake of the reputation of the Church of 
England Temperance Society, no less than the interests of mankind.”21    The writer 
explained that Kerr used Vickers’ energetic efforts to find backers to convince Barry 
that Keeley’s intentions were financial, not medical.  The article did not name the 
London agent, instead suggesting that it was Keeley himself who directly sought 
backers for the scheme.  It stated further that there was no gold in the cure, that it 
had severe side effects, that American physicians resisted it, and that its supporters 
were delusional.  It suggested that all of these claims would be presented at the next 
meeting of the SSI, which hints that Kerr was the source, if not the author of the 
article.  Summing up, the BMJ declared that “there is no example in the whole history 
of mankind, so far as we know, in which any secret remedy has ever been found to 
be of permanent value, except to its inventors and vendors.”22 
Keeley was in London at the time and he cried foul in a letter to the BMJ that 
appeared one week later, on 2 July 1892. He introduced himself to the journal’s 
readership, explaining that he was a practicing “American physician of thirty-two 
years' standing.” 23  He added that he also held “the important appointment of 
surgeon to one of the greatest railroads in the United States—the Chicago and 
Alton.”24  He was quick to note that he was in London “at the request of Englishmen 
who have asked me to come over and assist in establishing an institute in London 
such as that which I have myself carried on at Dwight, Illinois, for thirteen years.”25 
Keeley’s therapy at Dwight—which was to be the model for the London clinic—was 
“neo-Washingtonian,” according to Baumohl.  The Washingtonian Temperance 
Society was a short-lived American organization of recovering, mostly working-class 
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male drunkards that emerged in the late 1830s.  It had vanished by 1850, but it was 
influential in its reliance upon the self-help of its members who gathered to tell their 
stories and to support one another as they quit drinking.  The Washingtonians 
established inebriate homes, which admitted voluntary patients for brief stays in 
order to sober up.  The homes were very different from the asylums favored by 
Crothers, Kerr and the mainstream inebriety societies on either side of the Atlantic.  
They were non-coercive, charitable, and relied on the support of reformed drinkers.26  
Unlike most inebriate homes, the Keeley Institute required payment, but like them, it 
was voluntary and former patients formed a crucial aftercare network.  Keeley’s 
reliance on the Gold Cure medication added a “scientific” twist to the Washingtonian 
model, which was based almost entirely on moral suasion.  Keeley’s patients were 
overwhelmingly male. They gathered four times each day for an injection of the tonic, 
which was the institute’s ritualistic centrepiece.27  A much smaller number of women 
were treated at Dwight and also in London as we shall see, but they lodged and 
received their medications in private, separately from the men.  Outside of the 
injection routine, patients were mostly left on their own, but inspirational lectures by 
Keeley or by former patients were an important part of the Dwight experience. 
Back in London, however, Keeley faced the task of answering his mainstream 
rivals.  He argued that the accusations made in the 25 June BMJ article were untrue 
and that his treatment would remove the “drink crave” from habitual alcohol and drug 
users.  He promised that he would soon appeal to the profession as it wished by 
“publishing my formula in full detail,” but “at this moment I only say that my remedies 
do contain gold, and that your information on that point is as misleading as it is on 
other points.”28  Keeley then rounded on his accuser.  He wrote that he was 
surprised at Kerr’s behaviour because “in July last, when I was in London, Dr. 
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Norman Kerr did me the honor to call upon me three times; he presented me with 
copies of his works on the subject of inebriety, and he paid me nothing but 
compliments.”29  Keeley accused Kerr of duplicity, of acting behind his back “which is 
not a course usually taken by gentlemen.”30 
Before publication, the BMJ gave Kerr a copy of Keeley’s letter and asked for 
a reply.  The letters were published together, and Kerr explained in his response that 
he had acted “after consultation with representative members of the medical 
profession who, like myself, were deeply concerned for the good name of our 
esteemed Bishops and of the Church of England Temperance Society.”31  He 
claimed that he did not initiate the 1891 meeting with Keeley and that he had never 
praised Keeley’s methods.  Kerr’s letter echoed many American attacks on Keeley 
and restated the original BMJ accusation, declaring that “neither I nor any 
respectable member of the profession in Britain could have anything to do with a 
proprietary secret remedy.”32  Kerr explained that “it was the duty of honourable 
medical practitioners to place the details of their treatment openly and unreservedly 
before the profession.”33 . Kerr’s response betrays a very strong sense of personal 
and professional offense.  He was concerned about Keeley’s assertion of duplicity 
and tried to turn the tables, writing that “the only going behind the back of anyone 
was when some person or persons used the name of the Church of England 
Temperance Society, and secured the chairmanship of a prelate ‘behind the back’ of 
medical members of the society, who surely ought to have been the first persons to 
be consulted in such a matter.”34  For Kerr, the defence of three things, church, state 
and professional authority grounded in ethical practice all demanded the rejection of 
the Keeley invasion. 
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The dispute intensified three days later, when the SSI met on 5 July 1892.  
Keeley declined an invitation to attend because he was giving a lecture elsewhere in 
London.  The SSI meeting made special note of Dr. J. E. Usher’s about to be 
published book, Alcoholism and its Treatment.  Usher, a new member of the society, 
was visiting from Australia and was its special guest.  Kerr, as always, chaired the 
session.  Usher was very handy because the third chapter of his book heaped scorn 
upon the American Gold Cures and particularly on the originator of the therapy, 
Leslie E. Keeley.  The chapter notes that the current use of drugs in the treatment of 
alcohol habits was a phenomenon based primarily in the United States where, he 
argued, it found an eager and gullible audience.  Usher wrote that “the age of healing 
by faith appears to be resuscitated with all the vigour which characterised similar 
attempts at influencing the body and the mind which were the basis of the 
alchemists’ power in the middle ages.”35 He used the case of Roger Bacon, an 
English friar who released his “essence of gold” upon a “credulous and not-over 
intelligent” medieval world to illustrate his point.36  Usher used more recent historical 
examples to show how shrewd English physicians had seen through American 
quackery in the past. 37  Summing up his survey, he wrote that “there is a fascination 
about the word ‘gold’ which appeals not alone to the imagination, but also to the 
‘common sense’ of the most practical of mankind.”38  His suggestion was that the 
“practical” people—the working people—were easily taken in by the rhetoric of 
“gold.”  
Usher’s obvious target was “the latest modern convert to alchemy… Dr. 
Keeley of bi-chloride of Gold notoriety, resident at Dwight, Illinois, United States of 
America.”39  He noted that Keeley had some “good fortune” when a variety of 
journalists praised the cure but immediately noted that one of them soon relapsed, 
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was pulled from a gutter, and died in a charity hospital.40  Usher offered no evidence 
for his suggestion that many other deaths could be blamed on the Keeley cure.  He 
pointed out that he had visited Dwight in order to investigate for himself, but in a 
letter to the Lancet, Keeley claimed that Usher had visited in the frustrated hope of 
acquiring a Keeley franchise of his own.41  Usher could not deny that many 
thousands of people said that the Gold Cure had helped them, but he speculated 
that the cure worked in the mind.  He further suspected that many of the patients he 
encountered were not actual drunkards but had come only because the cure was 
fashionable.  He claimed that Keeley appealed to the “psychic or imaginative side of 
man,” but his strongest point was the same one that all Keeley critics shared.  Usher 
complained that the use of a secret cure placed Keeley beyond “the pale of 
Aesculapian values” and concluded that the Gold Cure “cannot therefore be 
recognised.”42  Before the meeting closed, Kerr presented an analysis of the Gold 
Cure that he had commissioned.  He explained that it found no trace of gold in the 
medication and that it had a high alcohol content.43 
The Lancet in England, and Ireland’s Medical Press and Circular, summarised 
the SSI meeting and published it for their readers in early July.  Keeley immediately 
hired lawyers and launched a libel suit against both journals.44 Within this febrile 
context, London’s Keeley Institute opened its doors in Autumn, 1892, under the 
supervision of Dr. Oscar C. DeWolf.  
 
Keeley’s Supporters 
Up to this point, the story of the Keeley company’s London clinic is colourful, but 
predictable.  The resistance from the British medical profession added a touch of 
nationalism and perhaps vehemence to what was already a familiar set of American 
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objections to Keeley and his Gold Cure.  Critics like Kerr and Usher challenged the 
Keeley company’s self-declared 95% success rate and even claimed that the Gold 
Cure harmed some patients, but attacks on the secrecy of the cure were ubiquitous.  
Keeley himself was perfectly comfortable with secrecy and defended it as legitimate 
protection of his interests.45  All of the critics agreed that the recovered inebriates 
who sang the Gold Cure’s praises were gullible, naïve and, in Usher’s words, “not 
overly intelligent.” 
Britain’s newspaper-reading public, however, met a broader range of 
perspectives in Keeley’s nationwide coverage, dating from just before the London 
Institute’s opening.  In December 1891 for instance, one writer explained to the 
readers of London’s Pall Mall Gazette that on a visit to Chicago she was unable to 
avoid talk of “the magic cure” for the drink habit on offer in nearby Dwight.  She 
visited the Institute and wrote that the “drunkards” were treated with respect and that 
they were regarded “as patients, not as sinners.”  She interviewed Keeley’s chemist 
and partner John Oughton, who defended the secrecy of the formula, saying that 
“experience has proved [that] the mysterious exercises considerable attraction over 
mankind.”  Curtis Judd, Keeley’s other partner and business manager told the 
Gazette that the Institute’s fee encouraged the patients to take the cure seriously 
and to quit drinking.  The Gazette writer was positively impressed, highlighting the 
Keeley Company’s 95% success claim.46  
The Gazette story was illustrated and it ran on the front page.  Articles about 
Keeley did not often receive that sort of attention, but they appeared in papers 
throughout the country.  In June 1892 the Gloucester Citizen reported that the 
London clinic had opened and that “Keeley is no mere enthusiast whose claims 
cannot be substantiated.  His system has done an immensity of good.”47  On 8 April 
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1893 the Sheffield Evening Telegraph and Star hoped that after rigorous testing, the 
cure would be “universally accepted.”48  Scotland’s Dundee Courier described “the 
great discovery by Dr. Keeley” whereby thousands of “the most abject and miserable 
slaves of drink,” drawn from “all classes and conditions” had been “restored to their 
families and relations with the craving for liquor wholly eradicated.”49  But not all 
reports were favourable.  The Manchester Courier, for instance, wrote in February 
1892 that Keeley had been “filling his pockets with gold, by the bi-chloride of gold 
system.”50  The equally suspicious Dundee Evening Telegraph, however, captured 
the broader journalistic tone when it maintained that, if the 95% cure rate was true, 
then the Gold Cure was “worth a more serious trial than we are always willing to give 
to things American.”51 
While there are no thorough descriptions of the London Institute in the 1890s, 
newspaper stories published slightly later supply some of the missing detail.  In 
1905, journalist Robert Barr interviewed several Keeley patients who told him that 
“there is no restraint; every man may come and go as he pleases so long as he is 
present at the hours specified for treatment.”  Most strikingly, patients were allowed 
to drink as much alcohol as they wished, so long as it was done on site.  Barr 
reported, however, that after three days of the Gold Cure medication, patients lost 
the “craving” and stopped drinking of their own accord.52  A 1909 article proclaimed 
that “drunkenness, whether continuous or intermittent, is as much a disease as 
leprosy or smallpox” and that the Keeley Gold Cure was undoubtedly “the most 
successful treatment.”  The reviewer explained that no patient was accepted for less 
than a four-week stay, which was “sufficient to cause a complete cure in the case of 
alcoholism.”  Drug cases, they explained, required five or six weeks.  The reviewer 
noted that “ladies are attended at the Institute, where they are entirely apart, and 
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have a separate entrance from the gentlemen.”53  Neither the 1905 nor the 1909 
article mentioned any aftercare provision. 
Perhaps most surprising, however, was the support that came from 
distinguished medical figures in Keeley’s London fight.  First among these was Oscar 
Coleman De Wolf, an American physician whose eminence is in inverse proportion 
to his almost total absence from the historical record.  De Wolf, born in 1835, was 
the director of the London Keeley Institute from its 1892 opening until 1902 when he 
sold his shares in the company and retired back to the United States.  He was an 
American physician who, most notably, had served as Chicago’s health 
commissioner for 12 years: from 1876 until 1889.  According to an 1889 article in the 
Chicago Inter-Ocean De Wolf took charge of an office in 1876 that “could hardly be 
called a department of health.  It had neither form nor comeliness and was doing 
nothing in the way of a sanitary work except keeping a registry of the deaths.”54 
Under De Wolf’s leadership, however, “the department has since developed into the 
most active and efficient health service in the country.”55   
Like Keeley, De Wolf had been a Civil War surgeon, but unlike him, he had 
benefited from an elite, international medical education.  De Wolf’s father was a 
physician and also a temperance activist and young Oscar first studied with him.  He 
went on to Berkshire Medical College near his childhood home, but then travelled to 
France for further study.  His time in France may help us to understand his attraction 
to the new bacteriology of Louis Pasteur, Robert Koch and others, which, by the 
1880s, he began to apply in his leadership of the Chicago Department of Health.  De 
Wolf took on the all-powerful Chicago meat packing industry, challenging its 
practices of dumping animal waste in the streets and particularly into the Chicago 
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River.  He also initiated the controversial practice of tenement inspections in hopes 
of eradicating Chicago’s periodic disease epidemics.56   
De Wolf thus pioneered what we might think of as a modern, activist public 
health department and in doing so, he established a national reputation as a leader 
in the public health movement.  De Wolf’s work also drew international praise.  The 
British Association for the Advancement of Science awarded him honorary 
membership in 1882, and in 1883 he received the diploma of the Society of Hygiene 
of France.  Nonetheless, long-standing opposition from the meat packers, combined 
with the 1888 election of a new mayor, brought De Wolf’s 12-year reign at Chicago’s 
Department of Health to an end.57  He quickly re-emerged, however, as the new 
medical director of the Keeley Institute’s proposed London clinic.58 
Unlike Kerr, De Wolf kept a low public profile in London, but he had a medical 
spokesperson that served a role similar to that which Usher had performed for Kerr.  
That was Dr. James Edmunds, a British physician with a CV that was as impressive 
as De Wolf’s.   He was the founding physician and leading light of the London 
Temperance Hospital from its opening in the mid-1870s until he left in 1891.  Like 
Kerr, he was a total abstainer who was committed, active and very well known in the 
London temperance cause.  Upon his 1891 retirement, the board of the Temperance 
Hospital noted that “the existence and history of the hospital have been a witness 
and record of the zeal and labours of Dr. Edmunds.”59  In another meeting the board 
stated that “the temperance world owes him a debt of gratitude for the noble stand 
he has taken (at one time almost alone amongst his London Professional brethren) 
against the use of alcohol in the ordinary treatment of disease.”60  The board noted 
the words of a London barrister who explained that “Dr. Edmunds, the practical 
founder of this hospital, is a man whom to know is to respect.”61   
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Edmunds appears to have sought Keeley out at the re-scheduled 
Westminster meeting, which went ahead on 5 July at St. James Hall, Piccadilly, 
without the endorsement of the CETS.62  Though not on the payroll, he took an 
active role in promoting the cure and kept up a vigorous correspondence with Keeley 
on the clinic and its progress in London.  Perhaps his most significant contribution to 
the Keeley project, however, was his very public defence of the cure that appeared 
in the 12 August 1892 edition of Health, an influential London-based medical weekly.   
Edmunds objected to what he described as “a rude and untruthful attack… upon an 
American physician.”63  He based his authority in the not at all unlikely assertion that 
he had “probably had more cases of inebriety referred to me professionally, than any 
other physician in London.”64 He explained, however, that “of late it has been forced 
upon my attention that inebriates from all parts of the world were making pilgrimages 
to Dwight, Illinois, U.S.A., and that morphia users and alcohol-drinkers, with whom 
no method had ever been useful, were coming back cured.”65 He added that 
“investigation convinced me that there was really “something” in the Keeley 
treatment.”66  And in support he offered to “produce in London now such cases for 
professional inspection.”67  He emphasised that he himself had “advised patients to 
go to the Keeley Institute, which is now available in London at 5, Portland Place.” 68  
He named only one example of a cured patient, but it was a valuable one.  Edmunds 
wrote that “Lord Graves… was taking, by hypodermic injection, twenty-five grains of 
morphia every day—a quantity which would kill any ten ordinary people.”  He had 
carried that habit for many years, according to Edmunds, despite frequent attempts 
to abandon it.  Upon visiting Dwight, however, Graves was cured in thirty-five days.69  
Edmunds noted that Graves would “be glad to see any one upon this subject if they 
will call upon him or write to him.”70   
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Edmunds knew how to use aristocratic patronage in support of a London 
medical enterprise.  While the exact identity of Lord Graves is difficult to pin down, 
his duties are not because he was on the Keeley payroll.71  In a 17 August 1892 
London memo, Keeley gave De Wolf, Graves and a British accountant separate 
responsibility for running the new institute.  De Wolf was in charge and handled all 
medical issues, but Graves, “by his extensive acquaintance and honourable name, 
and his well-known connection with the Keeley treatment will be influential in 
securing patients.”72  The final agreement stated that Lord Graves was free to “use 
his own judgement as to such methods and ways as he chooses to adopt to 
accomplish the best results” and that he would be paid 200 pounds per annum.73  De 
Wolf wanted Graves to sit at a desk and do a day’s work if he was being paid, but 
Edmunds disagreed, writing to Keeley that using him “like a clerk is to cut up a 
pedigree racehorse for cat’s meat.”  He explained that Graves was “ornamental,” that 
he fulfilled “the role of a benevolent nobleman really grateful to Dr. Keeley and 
anxious to do all he can to make known the benefits to be obtained by the Keeley 
Treatment.” 74 
 Edmunds’ most arresting claim, however, was to take on the key point made 
against Keeley by organised, professional medicine everywhere in the world.  While 
noting that “we have a professional rule against the use of secret remedies, and to 
this rule, in general, I subscribe,” Edmunds emphasised that “eminent physicians do 
not all adhere to this non-use of secret remedies.” 75   He insisted that what mattered 
most was the results of the treatment, not blind adherence to a code of ethics, which 
served “only to enable a profession to prey upon the body politic.”   These standards, 
Edmunds argued “are trades-union devices, dishonest in their intent against the 
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public, and corrupting in their action upon the profession which they are supposed to 
serve.”76  Edmunds did not pull his punches.  He went on:  
Assuming that the Keeley treatment cures our inebriates, the fact that its nature 
is kept secret does not invalidate the value of the treatment to the public; it 
merely prevents Tom, Dick, and Harry in the profession from pocketing the fees 
which now fall to the inventor of the method.  That fact, however much it may 
vex the souls of Tom, Dick, and Harry, is a matter of no interest to the public, 
and it does not, by the touchstone of a real professional etiquette, justify the 
profession in attempting to prevent the use of the method.77 
Summing up, Edmunds wrote that “careful watching and study of Dr. Keeley’s 
results have convinced me that Dr. Keeley knows more about handling morphia-men 
and alcohol-drinkers than all the rest of the profession put together.”78  It is hard to 
imagine a more emphatic endorsement from a more qualified endorser.  De Wolf had 
the letter reproduced as a circular and sent it to 15,000 physicians throughout Britain 
and it seems to have done its work, as a steady stream of patients and curious 
physicians made their way to the Keeley Institute, beginning in the Autumn of 1892.  
The letter did not, however, earn Edmunds any new friends in the professional 
medical circles that were critical of Keeley.  In an October 26 letter, De Wolf 
explained to Keeley that Edmunds’ Health letter was “causing much talk in medical 
circles here and some angry feeling.”79   
Edmunds’ second major contribution to the Keeley cause was his formation of 
an independent committee of distinguished British temperance reformers to review 
and evaluate the results of the London clinic.  On 30 November 1892 De Wolf stated 
the necessity of such testimony, writing to Keeley that “the American literature of all 
and every kind is of no service here.”80  For De Wolf, this was at least partly a class 
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issue: “the only people we can reach and impress here are from an excellent class (I 
mean educated and intelligent) and they want sober and careful statements from 
English, not American sources.”81  Edmunds supplied those sources, drawing upon 
the friendships he had made in a lifetime of temperance advocacy to assemble a 
committee that would report upon the results of the cure.82  The Rev. Canon James 
Fleming headed the new group, another total abstainer and a long-time temperance 
campaigner.  He was Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, to the Prince of Wales and 
also to the Duke of Westminster.  Fleming continued in that role when his friend, the 
Prince of Wales, became King Edward VII in 1901.  He was close to the royal family 
and was Vicar of St. Michael’s, Chester Square, in the wealthy Belgravia district of 
London.  De Wolf explained to Keeley that “Fleming is a great man here and strongly 
inclined your way.  He has no patience with pretenders and does not approve of the 
course of the doctors.”83  
Edmunds also brought in James H. Raper (1820-1897), who was, according 
to his 1898 biographer, “unquestionably the most popular orator of the temperance 
movement.”84  Besides his temperance credentials, the biographer noted Raper’s 
reputation for “scrupulous fairness of conduct distinguished him throughout his 
career.”85  Raper was also well thought of by older temperance campaigners in the 
United States.  James Dunn, editor of the American National Temperance Advocate 
wrote upon his death that “no man in connection with the temperance reform 
movement ever visited this country who made such a deep impact upon the 
American people.”86 Dunn noted that Raper was a close friend of Neal Dow, 
America’s “Napoleon of Temperance,” and that he had befriended William Lloyd 
Garrison and Wendell Philips.87  The final committee places were taken up by W. 
Hind-Smith Esq., former Superintendent of the YMCA and William Saunders, Liberal 
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MP for Hull and Vice President of the UK Alliance temperance organisation.88  
Edmunds himself would serve as the committee’s fifth member.  Though it was an 
independent, public committee, it is clear that Edmunds chose its members carefully.  
De Wolf explained to Keeley that the committee “will be of commanding character, 
particularly on the temperance side.”89  It is no wonder that De Wolf also declared to 
Keeley that “we shall ultimately have a good report from that committee.”90   
The report was very good indeed.  The committee issued five of them 
between 1892 and 1897, all written by Fleming.  Membership changed slightly over 
the years as some members came and went.  Saunders was too busy to participate 
and was replaced by Amos Schofield, another total abstainer from the UK Alliance.  
William Cunard of the shipping line wished to have his name included but was also 
too busy to be an active participant.  In the early summer of 1897, the London 
Keeley institute had its first five reports printed as a 36-page pamphlet, which it 
distributed and made available to anyone who inquired.  The pamphlet also included 
a collection of letters and testimonials from the clinic’s patients, alongside statements 
from Keeley, De Wolf and even Neal Dow.  Over its five-year project, the committee 
met a number of times and members visited the clinic frequently.  The first report, 
dated February 1893, explained that the committee had visited the Institute six times 
in its first two months of existence and had interviewed the twenty patients who were 
then under treatment or were recently discharged.  It concluded that all of the 
patients “were genuine cases of long standing inebriety,” that “in no case have the 
remedies used produced any pain [or] inconvenience,” that “in no case has any 
patient been put under restraint,” and that all patients “affirm positively that, in 
periods varying from three to seven days, they lost the crave for alcohol.”91 
 23 
The next four annual meetings followed the progress of these original twenty 
patients and added new patients to the review each year.  In the second year, it 
found that of the original twenty, two had relapsed, but the others all remained free 
from their former habits.  That number remained the same for the third annual report 
in 1895.  The committee therefore pronounced the 18, still-sober patients “cured” 
and noted that 17 of that group had tried and failed at other English “inebriate 
homes” before they came to Keeley.92  For the fourth meeting in 1896, the 
committee met 50 patients and received letters from others who could not attend.  It 
reprinted excerpts from these letters and declared that “the results of the Keeley 
Treatment justify [the committee’s] most sanguine hopes” and that “the time had 
come to make such benefits of the Keeley Treatment widely known.”93 
In this crucial fourth report, Fleming made clear that his committee—
composed of elderly men whose long lives had been devoted to the temperance 
movement—had different interests than the physicians who had been so critical of 
the Gold Cure.  He explained that members were “fully aware that it is a standing 
rule in the Medical Profession that any man who discovers a remedy for disease is 
expected to make it known.”94  That issue, however, did “not fall within the province 
of this committee” whose job it was “simply to watch the results of the treatment, and 
to report impartially on them to the public.”95  Instead, he argued, “these results are 
intensely interesting to all engaged in Temperance Reformation; for, when cases 
remain cured for one, two, three, four years, they become irrefutable facts.”96  By 
focussing on results rather than method, and perhaps even more significantly, by 
invoking the older rhetoric of temperance, the committee simply bypassed the 
medical critique.  In comparison, the medical criticism looked petty.  It suggested that 
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Kerr and the SSI were more interested in themselves and the rules of their guild than 
they were in the suffering of the patients who sought relief from their habits.  
Fleming included a report by committee member Amos Schofield in the 1897 
pamphlet. It described his visit to Dwight, undertaken with a delegation from the UK 
Alliance, making clear the attraction of Keeley’s approach to temperance reformers.  
Schofield explained that Keeley, who insisted that his own efforts were strictly 
medical, “does not for a moment regard his operation as any substitute for moral and 
religious teaching, and he maintains vehemently that there is no safety for the cured 
patients… who wilfully and repeatedly place themselves in the way of temptations.”97 
Further, Schofield and the other teetotallers on the committee must have felt great 
personal vindication in knowing that “Dr. Keeley also insists upon total abstinence 
from all intoxicating liquors as the only safe position for his graduates to assume.”98  
The committee’s response to Kerr, the SSI and its professional supporters was thus 
two pronged.  In the first instance it prioritised self-reported results—successful 
cures—over shared ethical practice.  Secondly, it emphasized the way that Keeley 
grounded his claims in scientific medicine but nonetheless accommodated the moral 
sentiment of the older temperance movement. 
 We must note, however, an important absence from the committee after its 
first, 1893 report.  James Edmunds was not at the second meeting in 1894 and 
further meetings did not list the attendees, outside of Fleming.  There is no 
documentary evidence to explain Edmunds’ absence, but it comes on the heels of 
the intense disappointment that he and De Wolf felt at the Keeley company’s 
decision to drop its libel suits against the Lancet and the Medical Press in late July 
1893.  Though company managers had informed them on 8 December 1892 that 
they did not want to pursue the cases if Keeley’s personal attendance would be 
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required, De Wolfe and Edmunds spent the first half of 1893 trying to change the 
Americans’ minds. 99    
The bad news nonetheless came on 7 July, when the Times of London 
reported that the court required Keeley’s presence in London for the trial.100  One 
week later Keeley wrote to De Wolf, explaining that “The Lancet is the oldest medical 
Journal in the world, and no matter how good a case I might have; how clear I might 
make my proofs, the court would feel loath to censure such a journal, or to favour an 
American by so doing.”101  Keeley’s attorney in Chicago had advised him to drop the 
case, but let the final decision rest with De Wolf.  In a separate letter to De Wolf, 
Keeley placed a third, sealed letter from his Chicago attorney to his London attorney 
with instructions to drop the case.  He told De Wolf that “if the Lancet suit should be 
dropped in your opinion, deliver the letter enclosed” to the London attorney “and drop 
it.”102  De Wolf made up his mind very quickly.  On 8 August 1893 the High Court of 




 As De Wolf and Edmunds expected, the medical press celebrated its victory 
over the American “quack,” but by November the fuss had begun to die down.103  
Edmunds was neither questioned nor struck off the Medical Register over his 
adamant defence of Keeley.  He eventually moved to Brighton where he was 
registered year-upon-year until his death in 1911.  There were never any restrictions 
imposed upon his registration and his record remained unblemished.  De Wolf 
remained in London to manage the clinic.  The most surprising twist in this story, 
however, is that, despite the loud claims of victory and vindication by the medical 
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press, not to mention the unceasing hostility of the mainstream professionals, the 
London Keeley Institute prospered. 
On the one hand, the controversy made the 100,000-pound sale of the 
franchise impossible and the company eventually handed the operation over to De 
Wolf in 1894 for the considerably lower sum of 5,200 pounds.104  This proved to be a 
wise investment because, as the annual growth in the number of Fleming committee 
interviewees showed, the institute attracted a steady stream of eager patients 
through the 1890s.  De Wolf took a partner in 1900 and retired back to the United 
States in 1903, having “prospered beyond his dreams,” according to his 1912 
obituary, which reported that he “sold out his place and practice for a fortune.”105  In 
1901, the institute reported 153 patients, but reached a high of 449 patients in 1903.  
That number did not drop below 205 up to 1908 and, despite the Great War, 
remained relatively robust until the early 1920s.106  Between 1901 and 1908, the 
home clinic at Dwight made between $1476.00 and $7142.00 in annual sales of its 
medications to the London clinic.107  There is no record of the amount that the 
London Institute made from patient fees, but its income was undoubtedly 
proportional to the cost of the medicine it bought from Dwight.  This surprising 
accomplishment begs us to ask how the company survived despite the censure of 
mainstream professional medicine? 
The simplest answer is that the London Keeley Institute prospered by 
successfully attracting an upper-class clientele.  As we have seen, newspaper 
reports in 1905 and 1909 described the Keeley experience.  In addition to treatment 
details, the articles noted that patients were brought to the institute by friends and 
compared the London clinic to a “west end club.”  They praised its luxurious 
furnishings, its “thronged” smoking and billiards rooms and the electric lights in the 
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bedrooms.108  The “cuisine” was “in the hands of Harrod’s Limited” which, according 
to the 1909 review, was “a guarantee of its excellence.”109  In the company’s 1928 
winding-up orders, the clinic’s final manager explained that “the patients formerly 
treated by the Institute were persons who, before the war, were leisured people in 
well-to-do circumstances, but whose means have since become so reduced as to 
render them unable to afford the cost of treatment.”110  Edmunds’ use of Graves’ 
testimony had born fruit.  De Wolfe’s obituary explained that “patrons flocked to him.  
Officers of the army and navy, members of Parliament and many from the ranks of 
the nobility were his patients.”111   
Historian John K. Crellin first invoked social class to help explain Keeley’s 
success in 1980, but his work received little subsequent attention and no historian 
has developed the London story any further.  In terms of class, I have built upon 
Crellin’s point by adding detail, but shifting from empirical to conceptual analysis 
develops it further by showing that patient choice involved much more than 
allegiance to one’s class.112  On the one hand, the appeal to class brought patients, 
but in choosing Keeley over Kerr, those patients and even their physicians inevitably 
and often unintentionally took sides in a debate that was larger than most of them 
knew.  Few of the patients will have read the medical press, but as the Fleming 
committee discovered, many of them had tried other inebriate cures that failed them.  
They were not ignorant, and their relative wealth broadened rather than limited their 
therapeutic options.  They knew that other options were available, but they 
nonetheless chose the Keeley Institute based on the advice of their doctors, 
accounts in the popular press, and word of mouth from friends.  Networks of 
association and acquaintance are the cultural lifeblood of any class system, and in 
that sense, taking the Gold Cure in 1892 London affirmed a particular class position.  
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But more significantly, it was a rejection of the power of mainstream, professional 
medicine to define and control alcohol and drug habits in the 1890s.     
Paul Starr’s influential 1982 discussion of the cultural authority enjoyed by 
physicians brings out this point’s broader significance.  Though his book is 
concerned with the history of medicine in the United States, Starr’s exploration of 
social and cultural authority sheds light on the outcome of this British debate about a 
controversial American physician.  Starr differentiates between a Weberian notion of 
social authority:  “the probability that people will obey a command recognised as 
legitimate according to the prevailing rules in their society,” from what he calls 
cultural authority: “the probability that particular definitions of reality and judgments of 
meaning and value will prevail as valid and true.”113  Physicians do not usually have 
a lot of social authority.  They do not give orders and automatically expect to have 
them followed.  Sometimes, however, they do have a measure of cultural authority, 
or the ability to construct reality “through definitions of fact and value.”114  Starr 
explains that “by shaping the patients’ understanding of their own experience, 
physicians create the conditions under which their advice seems appropriate.”115  
In the Keeley debate, Kerr and his mainstream colleagues simply did not have 
the cultural authority to dissuade habitués from taking the Keeley cure.  Many 
patients voted with their feet, signalling that, at least for them, Kerr and the SSI’s 
attempt to define “cure” or to shape patient experience was less convincing than 
Keeley’s.  They were unable to create the conditions that might have made their 
advice more compelling to more people.  As the Fleming committee made clear, 
ends rather than means mattered most to a non-professional audience.  The 
testimony of former alcohol and drug users, both published and by word of mouth, 
did more to shape patient understanding of “reality” than did Kerr’s insistence on 
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ethical conduct.  Openness was important for both groups, but each group 
understood that in its own way.  While Kerr and his associates extolled the virtues of 
professional openness, the former inebriates’ testimonials fashioned a powerful 
openness between patients.  Their testimony, disseminated by Keeley’s supporters 
and by his advertising, both presupposed and helped to create a community of 
patients and carers whose standards of medical legitimacy differed from Kerr’s.  The 
Institute’s success confirms the vigor of that community and exposes the limits of 
professional medicine’s ownership of “inebriety” in the 1890s.   
Yet the two approaches shared much.  In a second reflection on Keeley’s 
London success, Crellin notes that the Institute benefitted from the insistence of 
Kerr, the SSI and others that the alcohol and drug habit was a functional disease that 
medical intervention might relieve.116  Sarah W. Tracy turns the tables, arguing that 
Keeley outdid the regulars in popularizing their “disease concept” in the United 
States.117  These are important insights, but as we saw with class, further conceptual 
analysis develops them and shifts our attention to the wider stakes of the Keeley 
controversy.  Up until now, I have followed most historians in describing the Keeley 
debate as a binary opposition between two different approaches to habitual alcohol 
and drug use.  Pushing beyond their apparent opposition, however, means more 
than noting that each inadvertently helped the other.  It requires us to examine the 
fundamental complementarity of these two iterations of inebriety, grounded as they 
were in a more thoroughgoing medicalization of habit. 
In a recent study of British medical advertising between 1840 and 1914, Legal 
Historian Anat Rosenberg has placed courtroom struggles over quackery among the 
most significant debates about advertising during the years surrounding the Keeley 
debate.  She argues that “the quackery debate led to a legal elaboration and 
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formalization of views of advertising as a field of exaggeration, epistemologically 
doubtful, but not illegal.”118 This emergent view of advertising as exaggeration “was 
part of a conceptual boundary between science and the market” that was equally 
useful to both sides.  “Science was established as a paradigm of modern truth by 
being associated with restraint.  Lack of restraint by advertisers rendered the 
consumer market an epistemologically inferior but also a freer and therefore 
attractive realm of activity.”119   The Keeley libel case never went to court, but the 
claims and counterclaims of Keeley’s critics and his supporters were embedded in 
this contentious, medico-legal epistemology. 
It is easy to place each group within the rhetorical modes that Rosenberg 
identifies.120  Keeley’s support, both medical and popular, was tinged with the 
inescapable hyperbole of the company’s advertising.  His boosters praised an exotic, 
golden cure, discovered on a distant frontier by a pioneer physician who had every 
right to keep his medication secret after a life-long search.  As we have seen, patient 
testimonials established the truth of Keeley’s claim that 95% of patients were cured.  
These were even stronger when the endorsements were drawn from the upper 
class.  Authorized by the testimonials, the presence of gold, and the genius-doctor’s 
good name, Keeley’s cure took on an air of miracle and magic, of exclusivity and 
value, of authenticity and purity.  His was a language of cure that offered hope to 
potential patients.  The Fleming committee further recognized that Keeley’s 
epistemology preserved space for the older, sentimental morality favoured by elderly 
veterans of the temperance movement.  Theirs too was a rhetoric of excess—of 
emotion, empathy and feeling.  It was grounded in affective faith rather than logical 
positivism and it fit comfortably within a conceptual universe shared by Keeley. 
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Conversely, the regulars, led by Kerr, Usher and the SSI offered a sober 
language of strict adherence to an ethical code, invalidating any potential cure 
brought about by a secret formula.  Theirs was a rhetoric of caution and restraint, of 
slow and careful therapeutic progress, of watchfulness, ethical conformity and 
shared knowledge.  Like their mainstream colleagues, they dealt in “observable 
effects rather than cures” and their authority lay in a medical model “that claimed 
privileged access to the human body by presenting its knowledge in terms of 
openness.”121 Their language is an example of the positivistic minimalism that 
Rosenberg assigns to the medical regulars.  As we have seen, in this instance it was 
unable to vanquish the therapeutic hyperbole that carried Keeley’s message to an 
eager public.   
The greatest significance of the debate, however, lies in the realization that 
these aggressively hostile camps did not undermine one another.  Rosenberg 
argues that rhetorics of medical science and the consumer market were “inverse 
mirror images” of each other.122  The two modes were mutually dependent because, 
together, they made more sense than either could on its own.123  From this 
perspective the debate between Keeley and Kerr was not a winner-take-all contest, 
nor did they simply help one another out.  This was, rather, a struggle between two 
iterations of the same paradigm—a boundary exercise based in broader debates 
about medical authority that nonetheless confirmed and clarified the overarching 
paradigm of habitual alcohol and drug use as a medical problem. 
Thomas F. Gieryn’s influential formulation of “boundary-work” offers a final 
point of reference.  He defines it as a “common rhetorical style” in which partisans 
establish social boundaries between science and “non-scientific social or 
professional activities.”  As such, boundary work, much like a literary “foil,” 
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establishes identity upon comparative difference.  In Gieryn’s example, we know 
Sherlock Holmes because he is not Dr. Watson.124  Boundary work is a “likely 
stylistic resource,” according to Gieryn, “when the goal is monopolization of 
professional authority and resources” because it “defines rivals as outsiders.”125  The 
London Keeley debate was an example of boundary-work on the part of Kerr and the 
regulars.  They attempted to delegitimize the Keeley cure because it broke the rules 
of a profession whose growing power was based on its status as science.  The 
effect, however, was not to banish alleged apostates like Keeley.  It was rather to 
help define and organize an emerging field of treatment and to confirm the status of 
habit as a disease.  Whichever physician or therapy one chose, mainstream or 
market, the assumption that underlay both was that “inebriety” was first and foremost 
a medical problem.   
The real victor of the Keeley debate, therefore, was the medicalization of habit 
itself.  The habitual use of alcohol and even of opiates was a familiar, indeed ancient, 
complaint, long understood in mostly moral terms.  The mid-to-late nineteenth 
century transformation of habit into a disease challenged those older ways of thought 
and was far from settled when the Keeley controversy erupted in London.  
Reconnecting with that debate reminds us that the medicalization of habit—the slow 
construction of what came to be known as addiction—was an unstable, contested 
process, that was tangled in other contentious discourses.  The London controversy 
emerged from a struggle between two competing iterations of habitual alcohol and 
drug use as inebriety.  One version was expressed in the language of professional 
ethics and the other relied on the popular semantics of cure.  In this case cultural 
authority lay with the latter, but their interplay helped to confirm the broader 
paradigm and thus exemplified the process of medicalization.  Keeley’s combination 
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of sentimental and scientific rhetoric endorsed by upper-class patient testimonials 
ensured that the London clinic would survive among the longest lived and most 
successful of all the Keeley franchises.  Its struggles with mainstream medicine 
helped to confirm and organize a contentious paradigm—the disease concept of 
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